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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43166 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) WASHINGTON COUNTY NO. CR 2014-5610 
v.     ) 
     ) 
GEORGE ORVAL ROARK, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 George Roark appeals, asserting that the district court abused its discretion 
when it imposed his sentence in this case.  He asserts that, in light of the 
recommendation for treatment and the efforts to get him into an appropriate treatment 
program, the district court should have imposed a sentence which would have made 
him parole-eligible in a timely manner, such that he could timely take advantage of that 
treatment program.  Thus, this Court should either reduce Mr. Roark’s sentence as it 
deems appropriate or, alternatively, vacate his sentence and remand this case for a 
new sentencing hearing. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Roark tried to be honest with the police from the outset of this case, 
admitting, and accepting responsibility for, the fact that he had been driving his car while 
intoxicated.  (Tr., p.184, L.19 - p.185, L.3.)1  In fact, at trial, he stipulated to the facts of 
the underlying DUI and only challenged the sufficiency of the State’s evidence on the 
alleged enhancement – that this was his second felony conviction within fifteen years.  
(See Tr., p.147, Ls.8-18 (stipulation); Tr., p.156, L.17 - p.177, L.7 (trial on the 
enhancement).)  He was ultimately convicted of the enhanced DUI charge.  (R., pp.64-
65.)  
 The subsequent GAIN-I evaluation of Mr. Roark noted that his primary issue was 
alcohol dependence, and the evaluator recommended he participate in Level III 
Residential Treatment to address that issue.  (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), p.61.)2  At the ensuing sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted 
that Mr. Roark’s family had been working hard to help get Mr. Roark into a treatment 
program that focused on rehabilitation within the framework of Mr. Roark’s Native 
American heritage.  (Tr., p.184, Ls.8-11.)   
Specifically, defense counsel argued the district court should consider that 
program because people of Mr. Roark’s heritage and beliefs “who have been through 
traditional [A]nglo treatment that has not been successful, but when they receive Native 
                                            
1 While the transcripts in this case are provided in two independently bound and 
paginated volumes, the citations to “Tr.” in this case all refer to the volume containing 
the transcripts of the suppression hearing held on September 2, 2014, the jury trial held 
on December 17, 2014, and sentencing hearing held on March 2, 2015. 
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
“Roark PSI.”  Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents attached 
thereto (police reports, presentence evaluations, etc.). 
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American treatment, because of their basis in the Native American religion[s], they are 
successful.”  (Tr., p.182, Ls.20-24.)  However, a hurdle in getting Mr. Roark fully 
evaluated for that program arose a few days before the sentencing hearing:  “because 
his GAIN I was produced by a third party, they could not use it in order to make a 
referral to the Native American treatment program that we had been looking at.  He [a 
representative of Mr. Roark’s tribe] encouraged me to contact that treatment provider or 
have the treatment provider where he was referred, have them contact the [Native 
American] treatment facility.”  (Tr., p.183, Ls.13-24.)  As a result, defense counsel 
recommended a sentence with only one year of fixed time, which, with credit for time 
already served, would make him parole-eligible almost immediately, and so, would most 
likely facilitate Mr. Roark’s timely evaluation and entry into the treatment program most 
likely to be successful in rehabilitating Mr. Roark.  (Tr., p.182, Ls.10-12.) 
However, the district court rejected that recommendation.  Instead, it imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed based on Mr. Roark’s criminal 
history.  (Tr., p.185, L.10 - p.186, L.25; R., pp.84-85.)  In doing so, it recommended that 
Mr. Roark participate in the prison’s therapeutic community program.  (Tr., p.187, Ls.1-
2; R., p.84.)  Mr. Roark filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction.  
(R., pp.92-94.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Roark’s sentence. 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Mr. Roark’s Sentence 
 
When imposing sentence, the district court is to consider the four objectives of 
sentencing:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing.  State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).  The protection of 
society is the primary objective the court should consider.  Id.  Therefore, a sentence 
that protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered 
reasonable.  Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  This is because 
the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, 
each must be addressed in sentencing.  Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.   
However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that rehabilitation “should 
usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.”  
State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in 
State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).  Timeliness and effectiveness of the rehabilitative 
opportunities are important considerations in this regard.  See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 
Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 
228 (1971); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). 
In this case, the district court’s sentencing decision failed to meet this standard.  
The historical facts of Mr. Roark’s criminal history upon which the district court primarily 
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relied (see Tr., p.185, L.10 - p.186, L.25) are certainly relevant at sentencing, but that 
history only reinforces the need to find a treatment program that will actually help 
Mr. Roark rehabilitate.  Cf. McCoy, 94 Idaho at 240 (holding that rehabilitation should 
usually be the initial consideration for a sentencing court).  Otherwise, the sentencing 
decision merely reinforces the cycle of alcohol abuse demonstrated by Mr. Roark’s 
history.   
To that point, defense counsel explained that, because of Mr. Roark’s Native 
American heritage, treatment programs based in an Anglo way of thinking may not be 
effective in addressing the critical issues in the same way a program from the Native 
American perspective would.  (Tr., p.182, Ls.20-24.)  And yet, the district court’s 
sentencing decision only provides for Mr. Roark to participate in one such Anglo-
perspective program – the prison’s therapeutic community program.  (Tr., p.187, 
Ls.1-2.)  Because that decision does not promote effective rehabilitation, the district 
court’s sentencing decision does not promote long term protection of society in the way 
tailoring Mr. Roark’s sentence to foster rehabilitation in a program appreciating his 
heritage and beliefs would.  As such, the district court’s decision represents an 
unreasonable consideration of the sentencing objectives, and thus, an abuse of its 
discretion.   
Considering the rehabilitative opportunities properly is particularly important in 
this case, since the GAIN-I evaluation determined that Mr. Roark’s primary issue, 
alcohol dependence, would be best addressed by a residential treatment program.  
(PSI, p.61.)  As such, Mr. Roark, with the assistance from his family, was trying to 
arrange precisely that sort of effective opportunity for rehabilitation.  (Tr., p.184, 
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Ls.8-11.)  The only trouble was getting a sufficient evaluation of Mr. Roark for the 
program.  Again, the need to appreciate Mr. Roark’s heritage in addressing the 
sentencing decision is necessary – while the GAIN-I does reveal useful information, it is 
not sufficient for evaluation in the Native American program.  (See Tr., p.183, Ls.13-24.)   
Appreciating this fact, defense counsel recommended a shorter fixed sentence, 
whereby Mr. Roark would be more quickly eligible for parole, such that he would more 
likely get the necessary evaluation and begin the new treatment program in a timely 
manner.  That scenario would best serve all the sentencing objectives.  The district 
court’s decision, which rejected that option, thus fails to make rehabilitation (as opposed 
to retribution) the initial consideration.  See McCoy, 94 Idaho at 240.  For all these 
reasons, the district court’s sentencing decision constitutes an abuse of its discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Roark respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 19th day of November, 2015. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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